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Abstract
In its endeavour, Islamization projects done by some Muslim organisations in 
Indonesia can lead to certain treats of  intolerance, especially to those rejecting 
the missions wrought about in the movements. Using qualitative approach, this 
paper tries to analyse the legal Islamization programs undertaken by Gerakan 
Reformis Islam (GARIS) in Cianjur, West Java, since their inception in early 
2001 and its inclination to various intolerant attitudes towards others. The 
movement of  Islamization is probed on the basis of  the three main GARIS 
projects, namely, reviewing the draft of  Indonesian penal law, engaging contra-
Christianization movements and the struggle against Ahmadiyah. Describing 
the movement, one will see how the idea of  legal Islamization is carefully and 
persistently moulded in the field to make it so fluid and adequate to accomplish 
a purpose. What seems appearing in this phenomenon is not a theoretical legal 
quandary but more a political one, as legal Islamization is in its practice more 
sensed as a political movement than that of  law.
[Dalam praktiknya, gerakan Islamisasi yang dilakukan oleh beberapa 
organisasi Islam di Indonesia dapat memunculkan tindakan intoleransi, 
utamanya hal itu menimpa mereka yang menolak gerakan tersebut. Dengan 
menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif, paper ini berusaha untuk menganalisis 
program-program Islamisasi hukum yang dilakukan oleh Gerakan Reformis 
Islam (GARIS) di Cianjur, Jawa Barat sejak mula berdirinya organisasi 
ini di awal 2001 dan kecenderungannya kepada perilaku intoleransi kepada 
kelompok lain. Gerakan Islamisasi dari GARIS ini dikaji berdasarkan pada 
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tiga program mereka yang paling utama yaitu: usulan perbaikan terhadap 
draf  amandemen hukum pidana Indonesia, gerakan perlawanan terhadap 
kristenisasi, dan perlawanan terhadap kelompok Ahmadiyah. Melalui 
kajian yang mendalam terhadap organisasi ini, kita dapat melihat bagaimana 
program Islamisasi hukum tersebut dilakukan dengan kesungguhan di 
lapangan sehingga dapat meraih hasil sesuai dengan yang dicanangkan. Apa 
yang dapat kita lihat dari fenomena ini sejatinya bukanlah pergumulan teori 
hukum namun lebih sebagai perhelatan politik, karena pada praktiknya 
gerakan Islamisasi hukum itu lebih menonjol sisi gerakan politiknya 
ketimbang hukumnya.]
Keywords:  Legal Islamization, religious intolerance, GARIS, Indonesian 
penal law, contra-christianization, Ahmadiyah
A. Introduction
Referring to Article 2 Paragraph 2 of  Declaration on the Elimination 
of  All Forms of  Intolerance and of  Discrimination Based on Religion or 
Belief, intolerance can be defined as any acts of  ‘distinction, exclusion, 
restriction or preference based on religion or belief  and having as its 
purpose or as its effect nullification or impairment of  the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise of  human rights and fundamental freedoms on 
an equal basis’.1 Thus, such actions as not accepting a community or 
expressing or exposing hate to other community based on differences 
in religion or belief  can certainly be referred as the act of  intolerance. 
Based on such a definition, this paper will be devoted to discussing the 
movement of  legal Islamisation undertaken by Gerakan Reformis Islam 
(GARIS) in Cianjur, West Java, the movement of  which has given the 
result of  various intolerant attitudes to others with differences. 
In this paper, the discourse of  legal Islamisation is studied from 
the perspective of  its practical aspects, i.e., how the idea is developed, 
campaigned and impregnated throughout the Muslim society of  Cianjur, 
* I should express my gratitude to Prof. Martin van Bruinessen for his review 
and suggestions to the draft of  this paper, without which the ideas outlined in this article 
may not be legible. Any mistakes, however, are the sole responsibility of  the author.   
1  On the text of  the declaration see, A/RES/36/55. Declaration on the Elimination 
of  All Forms of  Intolerance and of  Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (10 Feb 2017), 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/36/a36r055.htm, accessed 10 Feb 2016.
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West Java, and thus giving the result of  intolerant actions. Using a 
qualitative method, the struggle to Islamize everyday lives of  the people 
is chosen as a means to see the dialectics between Islamic law and society. 
This paper will concentrate on seeing how the efforts of  Islamisation 
conveyed in GARIS programs have brought oppressions and intolerance 
to ideas, actions, people or groups having a different understanding of  
the certain (legal) interpretation or belief.
 In so doing, the paper will be divided into three cohorts: first, 
understanding the background and actors behind the rise of  GARIS 
movements in Cianjur; second, the structure and character of  the 
organization; and third, the struggle of  Islamisation conveyed in the three 
grand programs implemented in the field so far, namely, the review of  the 
draft of  Indonesian penal law, contra-Christianization movement and the 
struggle against Ahmadiyah. The data pertinent to the study was taken 
mainly from in-depth interviews with the main actors of  the organisation, 
involvement in some GARIS activities, as well as general observation in 
the lives of  some GARIS activists during the field research in Cianjur 
intermittently during the months of  2009 and 2013.
B. Background of  GARIS
It is indeed not clear what the date exactly GARIS was established, 
but its formation was certainly inseparable from the context of  
reformation movements rising steadily in Indonesian politics since the 
mid of  1998.2 It was a Muslim politician having the interest to establish 
a local hardliner group in Cianjur, West Java, who started this mass 
organisation. Named Chep Hernawan, originally from Cianjur and once 
a leading figure of  an Islamic party, Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Star 
Party, PBB),3 when it was established initially in 1998. Hernawan himself  
did not give so much interest to the organisation he initially founded in 
2 See also on GARIS in comparative studies with other Islamisation movements 
in other provinces in Jamhari Makruf  and Iim Halimatussa’diyah, Shari’a and Regional 
Governance in Indonesia: A Study of  Four Provinces, SSRN Scholarly Paper, no. ID 2459826 
(Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2014), pp. 1–15.
3 It is important to note here that PBB was the party claiming to be the 
embodiment of  the Masyumi tradition. See Bernhard Platzdasch, Islamism in Indonesia: 
Politics in the Emerging Democracy (Singapore: ISEAS Institute of  Southeast Asian Studies, 
2009), p. 34.
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1998 as he seemed more busied himself  in Jakarta with his activities as 
the treasurer of  the party. Yet, it was not until 2001 when he finally turned 
his focus to develop further the organisation since the environment in 
PBB was not conducive in his feeling to continue the career in national 
politics. He was so disappointed with the party, especially in its failure 
to assure the parliament bolstering the idea of  enlivening the Jakarta 
Charter in the amended 1945 Constitution. He was also once expressing 
his dissatisfaction with the leader of  the party, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, 
seen as not so sincere in the struggle of  legal Islamisation in Indonesia 
and even more enthusiastic toward individual material benefits, especially 
as his later appointment as the Ministry of  Law and Human Rights.4 He, 
therefore, decided to step down from PBB and continue his struggle in 
his home base, Cianjur. Upon his return, GARIS was thus rejuvenated 
after some years of  no activities. 
GARIS was first designed as an answer to the need of  some Muslim 
hardliners such as Anwar Haryono and Husein Anwar (both then the 
leading figures of  Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, DDII) to prevent 
the coming of  a number of  secular groups leaning towards socialism and 
communism in the new political landscape of  Indonesia. Hernawan was 
indeed in his younger age an activist of  Gerakan Pemuda Islam (Muslim 
Youth Movement, GPI) having a deep concern to the possibilities of  
reappearing communist groups in the country.5 The establishment of  
GARIS was, therefore, idealised as a means to block the new communism 
in all its forms. This is why GARIS is characteristically closer to radical 
religious groups concerned with neo-communism and liberalism in 
Indonesia. Thus, although it is local in its origin, the character of  GARIS 
and its activities and the way to disseminate their missions is inseparable 
from the country’s radical groups in general.6
4 Chep Hernawan, interview (8 May 2009).
5 DDII and GPI are both the Muslim organisations rooted in Masyumi tradition. 
Many see DDII as the leading custodian of  the Masyumi legacy, established in 1967. 
See  Platzdasch, Islamism in Indonesia, p. 34.
6 It needs to remember that Masyumi tradition is always strong in West Java. 
Many traditionalists in the region maintained their membership in Masyumi weathering 
the political changes occurred in other Muslim areas in Java. It seems logical here 
that what GARIS had developed in its movements was an attempt to revive majority 
Masyumi traditions in the region.
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The reactivation of  GARIS in 2001 was really in conjunction with 
the political situation of  Cianjur. This regency was at the time led by a 
devout Muslim politician well known for his concern to implement many 
Islamic values in everyday lives of  the people. Wasidi Swastomo was just 
elected as a regent of  Cianjur when Chep Hernawan returned to his home 
village. Swastomo was a kind of  literalist whose thinking of  religion was 
influenced by his religious teacher, Kyai Dadun Kohar, the well-known 
figure of  Persatuan Islam (Islamic Unity, Persis) from Sukabumi, West 
Java. It is thus not a surprise that many of  Swastomo’s programs were 
certainly coincident with the mission brought about by Hernawan since 
his previous political involvement in PBB, i.e., the struggle to involve the 
state government in the implementation of  Islamic law. The core value 
of  Hernawan’s struggle is the unity of  state and religion, and this should 
be reflected in direct involvement of  the government in strengthening 
Islamic law in the life of  the people. And what Swastomo had shown 
since his initial office was his concern to demolish many practices in the 
society seen as transgressing the principles of  Islamic beliefs.
One of  the core programs proposed by Swastomo at the time 
was the project of  Shari’ah implementation, called later as ‘Gerbang 
Marhamah’, the acronym of  the phrase ‘Gerakan Pembangunan Masyarakat 
Berakhlakul Karimah’ (the movement for developing a society with noble 
characters).7 The program itself  was designed by the belief  that the 
Shari’ah implementation project is needed as the perfect tool to improve 
the whole life of  the people in Cianjur. The actualization of  Islamic 
law in their lives was meant as the tool for social engineering where the 
local government directly involved in promoting Islamic injunctions and 
establishing moral values within the community.8 Swastomo himself  was 
so confident at the time that with the adoption of  his Shari’ah project the 
7 It is good to note also that the word “Marhamah” in Arabic means as the 
state of  being pity, compassion, merciful, sympathy, not disposed to severity. “Gerbang 
Marhamah” can thus be translated as the gate of  merciful, compassion, or sympathy. 
Imagining Cianjur as the place where people can achieve a state of  being merciful and 
compassion. See J. Milton Cowan, Arabic-English Dictionary: The Hans Wehr Dictionary of  
Modern Written Arabic, 3rd edition (Ithaca, NY: Spoken Language Services, 1976), p. 332. 
8 Michael Buehler, “Shari’a and Social Engineering: The Implementation of  
Islamic Law in Contemporary Aceh, Indonesia by R. Michael Feener (review)”, Indonesia, 
vol. 98, no. 1 (2014), p. 150. 
398 Al-Jāmi‘ah, Vol. 54, No. 2, 2016 M/1437 H
Ratno Lukito
executives will work more effectively and thus banishing the corruptive 
tradition still colouring the bureaucracy.9 Indeed, the word ‘Gerbang 
Marhamah’ was easily spreading all over the regent, commemorating the 
long-held imagination of  Cianjur as an Islamic region in the midst of  
beautiful and peaceful Sundanese enclaves in West Java.  
This kind of  program indeed invited a lot of  support from many 
Muslim organisations in Cianjur, notably from Muslim hardliner groups 
such as GARIS. Swastomo had therefore been successful in attracting 
political support from those Muslim organisations existing in the society. 
In its development, the phrase ‘Gerbang Marhamah’ had become such 
kind of  noble label for the city of  Cianjur, expressing imminently the 
commitment of  the whole people to implement the teaching of  Shari’ah 
in their everyday life. As a follow up to the Islamisation program, the 
regent then issued a Decision Letter No. 36 of  2001 impregnating the 
establishment of  the Foundation for the Study and Development of  
Islam (Lembaga Pengkajian dan Pengembangan Islam, LPPI), equipped 
with the rights to translate the grand ideas of  ‘Gerbang Marhamah’ into 
more practical rules and principles which would be used as guidance 
for executives in the process of  law-making in line with the teaching of  
Shari’ah.10 
Although the government was successful enough to promote the 
‘Gerbang Marhamah’ program throughout the regency, not all people 
understand the concept. Many were even sceptical towards the program, 
seeing it as more political in colour than a sociocultural-driven, in spite 
of  the mass support for the need of  enhancing moral virtues of  the 
people.11 Yet, this kind of  project is certainly in conjunction with GARIS 
commitment to bolster the implementation of  Islamic law within the life 
of  the people. Since the term ‘Shari’ah’ itself  as understood by GARIS 
members is the religious law governing the members of  the Islamic 
9 “Cianjur Semakin Tampak Religius”, Kompas, p. 8. As cited in Buehler, “Shari’a 
and Social Engineering”, p. 150.
10 Chep Hernawan, interview (23 Aug 2009). The socialization of  the 
Shariatization project has basically been undertaken in three basic programs: Preaching, 
education and economy. See Rohmat Suprapto, Syariah “Kacapi Suling” & Syariat Progresif: 
Pergulatan Politik dan Hukum di Era Otonomi Daerah (Yogyakarta: Samudra Biru, 2011), 
pp. 70–120.
11 Suprapto, Syariah “Kacapi Suling” & Syariat Progresif, pp. 121–59.  
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faith as derived from the religious precepts of  Islam, particularly the 
Qur’an and the Hadith, the program is not but a panacea to augment 
GARIS socio-political status. It is clear that what GARIS understands 
as ‘Shari’ah’ is essentially a canonical law, prescribing both religious and 
secular duties all Muslims should obey totally in their lives. In this way, we 
can thus see that GARIS members’ understanding about Shari’ah follows 
the traditional perspective of  many Muslims in which as a law Shari’ah 
comprises both theological and legal aspects. This legal cognition has 
certainly worked well to start with the Islamisation projects promoted 
by the local government.
The political situation of  the regent was thus very conducive for 
Hernawan to heal his broken political career in the national arena. At 
least with reactivating GARIS that his old ideals can be realised benefiting 
local movements, in the hope that it can finally reach the wider scope 
of  Islamisation to the whole nation. That is why many of  GARIS 
activities in its early phase of  reactivation were reflecting Hernawan’s 
ideas of  Islamisation, which were difficult to be implemented by way of  
national institutions such as PBB or any other political parties. He thus 
focused his Islamisation programs mainly on some local issues related to 
the implementation of  Islamic teachings in the grassroots. In this way, 
GARIS could become the partner of  the local government programs of  
‘Gerbang Marhamah’ since both have the same fundamental concern for 
avoiding people from any moral problems and other un-Islamic practices. 
In so doing, GARIS could use the programs of  ‘Gerbang Marhamah’ 
as a means to bolster its missions of  Islamisation, with the result that it 
could get a positive image of  an organisation having a good mission to 
succeed the government programs of  development. Thus, the two can 
work in the way of  symbiosis mutualism principles.
C. The Character and Structure
Since its first establishment in 1998, GARIS reflects very much the 
character of  a hard-line organisation preferring to use violent behaviour 
as its main approach. And this certainly is influenced by the attitude of  
its founder, Hernawan, in his encounters with many different values in 
society. He explained that in facing many un-Islamic practices, Muslim 
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should be firm and strong to oppose.12 He quoted one Prophetic tradition 
that when someone sees a wrongdoing, he/she should use the hands to 
change it, if  not use the tongue, or at least oppose it with the heart, thus 
reflecting the weakest believers.13 It is mainly based on the teaching of  
this hadith that Hernawan tends to use zero-tolerant attitude in facing 
many practices in the society seen as transgressing the principles of  
Shari’ah. It is thus not a surprise that since its early commencement, 
GARIS is very well known for its harsh approach to implementing 
many programs of  Islamisation. Common people in Cianjur therefore 
usually connote GARIS as ‘Organisasi Anti Maksiat’ (the organisation of  
anti-wrongdoings), reflecting the image of  GARIS as an organisation 
focusing their activities to bulldoze any bad behaviours committed by 
people. This is what we would like to categorise GARIS as one of  few 
organisations focusing its struggles on using ‘hard methodology’ of  legal 
Islamisation. This means that the main method of  Islamisation employed 
in this organisation tends to close with violence activities; the approach 
is more confrontational and less dialogue. Many of  GARIS activities are 
therefore not taken in the form of  oral debate or open discussion, but 
more going down to the field fighting the contender physically and often 
resulted in destructive outcomes.
It is not without reason therefore that many have recognised 
GARIS as another kind of  the well-known Islamic Defense Front 
(Front Pembela Islam, FPI) existing in Cianjur. In this case, Hernawan 
admitted himself  that FPI is kind of  mentor to GARIS.14 Many of  his 
approaches implemented in GARIS are a reproduction of  the method of  
struggle used by FPI. The zero-tolerant attitude in facing wrongdoings 
viewed as transgressing the basic tenets of  Islam has become the sole 
driver for those hardliners to continue the movements of  Islamisation. 
Thus, although GARIS and FPI have no structural relations, they are 
substantially the same and can be grouped into one family of  hardliners 
focused so much on moral and theological problems existing in the 
12 Chep Hernawan, interview (20 Jul 2009).
13 Al-Imām Abī al-╩usayni Muslim ibn al-╩ajjāj al-Qushairī al- Nīsābūrī, S{a╩ī╩ 
Muslim, ╩adith No. 70. (‘Man ra’ā minkum munkaran falyughayyir biyadihi fain lam 
yasta╢i‘ fa bilisānihi fain lam yasta╢i‘ fa biqalbihi wa dzālika ‘ad}‘aful īmān’).
14 Chep Hernawan, interview (25 Aug 2009). FPI is a vigilante Islamist group, 
established in 1999.
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society. This is what seemed to make non-GARIS members, either 
Muslims or not, in the regent feeling threatened to GARIS behaviours 
and attitudes in undertaking the Islamisation projects. That is why, it has 
apparently had also a clumsy relationship with such other bigger Muslim 
organisations as Muhammadiyah or Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in the region, 
as the two seems not to support such a frantic method of  preaching Islam. 
Many people, especially those non-Muslim minorities, rebuffed to talk 
openly about this organisation, depicting ostensibly their real aversion 
as well as disagreement with GARIS missions.15
The significant influence of  the founder of  this organisation is 
certainly not without consequence. Almost all activities are done with 
Hernawan as the sole funding party.16 He dominates the discourse since 
he the one who subsidises a lot of  GARIS activities. It is not easy indeed 
in such a poor society as in Cianjur to find a wealthy people willing to 
finance many activities done based on certain religious beliefs. In this 
case, what Hernawan has done is just reflecting an example of  how a 
few rich people in the midst of  a poor society have tried to build an 
influence using all means possible. If  so, it might not be without reason 
that Hernawan has persistently used his capital to continue his influence 
in GARIS. And he seems successful with this motive although with a dire 
consequence inflicted to the structure of  the organisation.
Indeed, Hernawan’s influence affects greatly to the structure of  
GARIS. The domination of  Hernawan as the sole founder reflects on his 
role as the top leader of  the organisation having all rights of  decision-
making. Although the board of  executive comprises of  some members, 
the persons fulfilling the position are all elected directly by Hernawan 
based upon their closeness and historical, personal relations.17 We can see 
therefore that the executive members consist of  those whose trust is not 
based on their merits but a personal relationship with the top leader. Since 
15 One Christian man indeed showed his feeling of  rebuff  when asked about 
GARIS movements. Christian figure, interview (10 Aug 2009).
16 It is not clear how could Chep Hernawan provide the finance of  the whole 
GARIS activities. One informant told the author that his funding was found basically 
from his father in law, named Haji Dapet, who was before the local rich businessman 
and a Persis figure, and also once an unsuccessful candidate of  Cianjur regent. Pranoto 
Iskandar, interview (8 Feb 2017).
17 Hernawan, interview (25 Aug 2009).
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its first formation in 1998, Chep Hernawan remains the chief  executive 
of  GARIS, while Yayan Hendrayana as vice director and Sugianto as a 
spokesperson.18 These two last members are the old friends of  him since 
he was still a student of  the Institute for Islamic Propagation (Perguruan 
Tinggi Dakwah Islam, PTDI) Tanjung Priok, Jakarta. To complete the 
structure, Hernawan also invited a number of  well-known hardliners 
in the country to fulfil the position of  the steering committee of  the 
organisation (Dewan Syuro), they are Abu Bakar Baasyir, Abdul Kadir 
Djaelani, Ahmad Sumargono, and Kholil Ridwan. Hernawan explained 
that he owes so much from those persons he views as his advisers and 
example, especially on their commitment to uphold the teaching of  Islam 
and their opinion of  the method of  Islamisation.
As an organisation built upon the personal relationship with the 
founder, not much can be said regarding the structure and the culture 
developed in GARIS, except for the fact that all organisational mechanism 
is created by a personal relationship between the top leader and the 
members. We cannot see therefore that GARIS has some common 
traditions normally practised in a mass organisation such as Congress 
to create a constitutional law of  the organisation, or having a common 
election to elect board executive members, etc. The structure already 
built in the organisation since its initial formation is still maintained and 
seems to exist there until the long future.
The structure of  the organisation is also strengthened through 
active involvement of  the members. As other radical groups in general, 
the membership of  GARIS can be attained through a relatively loose 
process. Someone can become a member of  GARIS without certain rigid 
and complicated bureaucratic process. Anyone can just attend or involve 
in certain activities of  the organisation to get a full membership. Let alone 
if  the person has close personal relationship with the leader. We can say 
that filtering mechanism seems to work here through the involvement of  
the person in any activities organised by GARIS.19 The principle seems 
thus to work that the more the one involves in their activities, the more 
the one will be accepted as a member of  the organisation.  
18 Ismail Hasani, Radikalism Agama di Jabodetabek & Jawa Barat: Implikasinya 
terhadap Jaminan Kebebasan Beragama/Berkeyakinan (Jakarta: Publikasi Setara Institute, 
2001), pp. 127–28.
19 Chep Hernawan, interview (26 Jul 2009).
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Currently, GARIS has claimed to have thousands of  members 
throughout Cianjur and other cities in West Java. One respondent 
explained that in Cianjur alone GARIS has succeeded to recruit no 
less than twenty-eight thousands of  members actively involved in their 
activities, while in Sukabumi, there are about five thousand persons ready 
to join any GARIS’s programs of  Islamisation.20 It is not easy however to 
get evidence of  this data as a written record of  the membership cannot be 
found in GARIS central office in Cianjur. As a rather loose organisation, 
GARIS seems not to recognise the membership based upon the modern 
way of  recording but more on the fact of  their involvement in every 
activities and program, and more importantly on their common religious 
understanding and sincerity to take part in the struggle of  Islamisation. 
D. The Struggle for Legal Islamisation
As said earlier, the main reason for the founder of  GARIS to 
establish the organisation in Cianjur is basically to continue his struggle to 
succeed the programs of  Islamisation which had failed through a national 
political party. There was a hope that through GARIS the broken ideals 
could be remedied and the objectives of  the Islamisation could finally 
be achieved even if  the project should be done in a merely local and 
smaller scope. Notwithstanding its different provision, the purpose of  
the struggle thus remains the same, i.e., to uphold Islamic values in the 
life of  the people and this can be done if  Islamic law can be implemented 
fully in the society. Although undertaken in such a localised arena, GARIS 
projects of  Islamisation have a similar substantive agenda. What makes 
GARIS looks distinct is its concern on religious practices in micro level of  
the society. Thus, the model of  the struggle here is one of  the grassroots, 
and the Islamisation of  law undertaken therein benefits more the bottom-
up approach where the involvement of  the members is used maximally to 
bulldoze any practices in the society viewed as transgressing the principles 
of  Islamic law. Thus what concern much here is not the application of  
the law from the macro level of  the state but more that of  the micro 
level where the teachings of  Shari’ah should appear in everyday lives of  
the people. Phrased differently, GARIS activities are mainly focused on 
the process of  legal application and not that of  law-making, although 
20 Hasani, Radikalism Agama di Jabodetabek & Jawa Barat, p. 125.
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the two seems, in fact, inseparable. This seems in line with the character 
of  GARIS as a local organisation confining its struggle on local agenda; 
the choice of  focus is therefore taken based on the character and scope 
of  the organisation. Yet, this does not mean that one can undermine 
this organisation due to its locality. A number of  GARIS activities have 
indeed wider impacts beyond Cianjur area so much as creating its label 
as one of  the most radical Muslim groups in West Java.
As a radical group preferring to use the hard methodology of  legal 
Islamisation, GARIS has so far focused on the problem of  Islamic law 
in Indonesian secular legal system. The main concern seems here not 
on the theoretical aspects of  the law but the legal application, especially 
those related to the position of  Islamic law. Thus, radicalism appears 
mostly as a primary method in their struggle to revive the Islamic legal 
application in the society, ignoring the fact that Islamic law is not the 
sole legal tradition in the country. Differently put, GARIS does not 
put their attention on how Islamic law can be applied in the midst of  
legal plurality, but more on the need of  every individual Muslim to 
consistently apply the religious law. Since its first inception, there are at 
least three legal issues GARIS has put their concerns in the struggle of  
Islamisation: the draft of  Indonesian penal law, Christian proselytization, 
and Ahmadiyah school. The three cases deserve to be discussed here 
since their relationship with the issue of  implementing Islamic law in 
the milieu of  national secular law. The first issue of  drafting Indonesian 
penal law touches the issue of  how to apply Islamic penal law in such a 
secular country. The second, Christianization deals with the problem of  
how to regulate religious preaching in a religiously pluralistic society of  
Indonesia; while the third on Ahmadiyah case relates specifically to the 
issue of  varied religious denominations existing in the country. The three 
cases will be discussed in the following pages as an example of  how as 
a non-state institution GARIS has consistently undertaken the project 
of  legal Islamisation during the last ten years.
1. Reviewing the Draft of  Indonesian Penal Law
 This activity seemed to be the first entry point of  GARIS 
reactivation in 2001. Since the main reason of  Hernawan retreat from the 
national arena was due to the failure of  PBB for consistently struggling to 
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implement the mission of  building Islamic penal law system in Indonesia, 
the localised approach activity focused on such a mission had indeed 
become the essential program for GARIS in Cianjur. Although the scope 
of  the project was kept as a small activity as it would only involve limited 
figures in Cianjur and other surrounding cities in West Java, the impact 
of  such activity was what believed to have inspired GARIS since its early 
commencement. The point is thus not the quantity but the quality that 
is hoped to give the maximum result for arriving at the ideal of  legal 
Islamisation in Indonesia.21
Many jurists in the country believe that the heydey of  legal 
Islamisation in Indonesian history was started when President Soeharto 
in his last decade of  power tried actually to create national regulations, 
adopting many aspects of  Islamic legal teachings. Even if  it was not so 
many in number, a number of  Islamic legislative and executive regulations 
were successfully made to reassure the implementation of  Islamic law 
in the public arena.22 This became the starting point for the Islamisation 
movement to continue when the regime was toppled down, and the 
new Reformation Order came to the surface colouring the political 
scene of  the country. Habibie’s short time presidency had even been 
recorded as the most pious period in the post-New Order era due to 
its rather massive product of  Islamic law using the vocabulary of  state 
law.23 Whatever the achievement that can be drawn in these big efforts 
of  legal Islamisation, one thing, however, remains unreachable, i.e., the 
implementation of  Islamic penal law in the system of  national law of  
the country. It is groundless to believe that the objective of  Islamisation 
is successfully achieved simply by the number of  such Islamic acts and 
regulations without factually capable of  substantiating Islamic penal law 
21 This might be comparable to the so-called ‘Islamisation from Below’ as what 
explained lately by Tim Lindsey, see his Timothy Lindsey, Islam, Law and the State in 
Southeast Asia, vol. I (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012), pp. 15–22.
22 For instance, Law No. 7 of  1989 on Religious Courts; Presidential Instruction 
No. 1 of  1991 on the Compilation of  Islamic Law.
23 See on this in Ratno Lukito, Legal Pluralism in Indonesia: Bridging the Unbridgeable 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 116–121. In a relatively short period 
of  Habibie’s presidency, there were 69 new laws promulgated, some of  them directly 
affected to the implementation of  Islamic law, such as: Law No. 10 of  1998 on Islamic 
Banking; Law No. 17 of  1999 on the Management of  the Islamic Pilgrimage; and Law 
No. 38 of  1999 on the Management of  Zakat (Islamic Charity).  
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teachings in the secular legal system of  the country. It depends on how 
we define the achievements indeed, but one proposition seems clear 
here that the essence of  the struggle relies upon the substantiation of  
Islamic penal law in the public arena. On the top of  the pyramid of  legal 
Islamisation, thus, the Islamic penal law system lays. The success of  legal 
Islamisation in the country will automatically be truncated whenever the 
penal law does not exist.24 
 Hernawan seems to believe in such a principle. The implementation 
of  Islamic penal law in the everyday lives of  the people is the mainstay 
of  the struggle for Islamisation. He, therefore, was so enthusiastic 
about the idea to continue the movement even if  the condition did not 
allow him to work it out by way of  national apparatus. If  he should be 
in disappointment with the Ministry of  Law and Human Rights (at the 
time his old close colleague in the struggle, Yusril Ihza Mahendra), he 
believed that the path towards Islamisation of  penal law should still be 
continued carefully. And, his zeal of  effort was strengthened considering 
the abundant resource persons in Cianjur and surrounding cities in West 
Java well versed with the knowledge of  Islamic penal law to back up the 
theoretical aspects of  the tradition. To realise this project, Hernawan 
got so much help from one local Islamic expert (Kyai) well known for 
his expertise in many classical books of  Islamic penal law (fiqh jināyah). 
The person in concern was Kyai Dede Abdullah, living in a small village with 
a number of  students devoted themselves to study Islam in his small boarding school 
in Maleber, Cianjur. Not much could be described this kyai except for his resilience 
to place Islamic law in real life of  the people. He once explained that a number of  
state officers from the Ministry of  Law and Human Rights in Jakarta came to him to 
consult many aspects of  Islamic law to be used as a raw material for the government’s 
programs of  drafting certain laws and regulations.25 It is therefore very strategic for 
Hernawan to approach him asking for assistance to succeed the program of  Islamic 
penal law. Hernawan realised that his knowledge on the substantive aspects of  the penal 
law was not adequate; what he had was only a passion and enough funds to support the 
idea of  the struggle.26 His willingness to involve the kyai in this program was certainly 
an effective step towards realising the program of  Islamizing penal law in Indonesia.
24 Daniel E. Price pinpointed five areas of  law touching the aspects of  
Islamisation efforts, namely: personal status, economic and business, religious practices, 
criminal law, and governing system. See Daniel E. Price, Islamic Political Culture, Democracy 
and Human Rights: A Comparative Study (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1999), p. 145.. 
25 Interview with Kyai Dede Abdullah (25 Jun 2013).
26 Chep Hernawan, interview (24 Jun 2013).
407Al-Jāmi‘ah, Vol. 54, No. 2, 2016 M/1437 H
Islamization as Legal Intolerance
Realising the history of  penal law in Indonesia, GARIS agreed 
that the best way to start the program of  Islamisation was to infuse 
abundant values of  Islamic penal law in the official system of  law of  
the country.27 This is believed to become a good leeway for step-by-
step building Islamic penal law system in such a pluralistic country of  
Indonesia. In so doing, the most effective program to undertake was by 
reviewing the draft of  the new penal law that had long been prepared 
by the government. By benefiting many Islamic experts (Ulama) living 
in Cianjur and its surrounding areas, Hernawan, therefore, was able to 
gather a lot of  ideas on how to start implementing the program. Thus, 
with the help of  kyai Dede Abdullah, GARIS organised a meeting of  
those Ulama concerned with the issue of  the draft of  the penal law. 
The meeting was held during the fasting month of  Ramadan in a small 
boarding school, Alawiyyin, in Maleber, Cianjur from November 26 
to December 3, 2001. The formal meeting was then continued for a 
week, 3-8 December 2001, gathering a smaller team of  Ulama specially 
undertaken to discuss furthermore and formulate a review of  the draft 
of  the penal law.28 The meeting was then totally held for full two weeks 
in the holy month of  Ramadan when all Muslims did the obligatory daily 
fasting during the month. Interestingly, this activity was conducted in 
cooperation with the Ministry of  Law and Human Rights and the local 
government of  Cianjur. Many Ulama from Sukabumi, Cianjur, Garut 
and Tasikmalaya were recorded to have attended this meeting, making 
this event as the first of  its kind successfully organised by such a local 
mass organisation as GARIS.  
Reading page by page the meeting report, one will get a sense of  
the complexity of  the debate involved to review the draft of  the penal law 
was. Resulted from a hard effort of  the government since the reformation 
era to answer the national need for having self-made penal law system, 
the draft of  the penal law itself  is very long, consisting of  no less than 
32 chapters and 644 articles. Many believe that since independence this 
country has never been able to produce independently its penal law 
system rooted from its values and traditions. The current Code of  Penal 
27 Hernawan, interview (25 Aug 2009); Kyai Meleber, interview (7 May 2013).
28 Usulan Perubahan RUU KUHP Hasil Musyawarah ‘Alim Ulama se Jawa Barat yang 
Diwakili oleh Kabupaten Sukabumi, Cianjur, Garut, Tasikmalaya, Cianjur, 10-18 Ramadan 1422-
-26 Nopember-3 Desember 2001 (Cianjur, 2001), p. iii. The document is with the author.
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Law (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana) that has been working since 
early independence era is an adoption of  the Dutch colonial penal law 
code as emanated in the Wetboek van Strafrecht (WvS), Staatsblad 1915 No. 
732.29 The need of  penal code believed as originally derived from national 
ideals and values thus becomes a national agenda unreachable yet until 
the current era, the draft of  the penal law is therefore hoped to become 
an answer for such a longing need in the system of  law of  the country. 
The impediments involved in the creation of  a new unified penal code 
in Indonesia are varied, however, one of  the biggest factors comes from 
Muslims in the country who are so persistent to put forward the teachings 
of  Islamic penal law tradition as the main source in the process of  making 
the draft. This problem is, in fact, a latent one since the dominance of  
Islamic law tradition in such a country with majority Muslim population 
can never be neglected in the process of  national law making.  
During the two weeks of  the discussion, those Ulama were so 
earnestly debating the content of  the draft. As clearly explained in the 
introduction of  the report, there is a common belief  among them that 
the current penal code cannot, in fact, hinder Indonesian people from 
many crimes still existing in the society.30 This creates a situation where 
the country has never been able to free itself  from bad situations haunting 
many aspects of  life. They are assured that Islam can offer the remedy 
of  those critical situations, i.e., by offering a distinct penal law tradition 
that can guarantee the order of  life where justice and welfare of  the 
people are always upheld. They, for example, putatively proposed that the 
draft of  the penal code that will be submitted to the People Assembly in 
Jakarta should maximally incorporate Islamic penal law teachings. Their 
main task, therefore, is to make a review of  the draft and propose some 
comments and suggestions based on their expertise and understanding 
of  the Islamic penal law.31
On the cognitive aspects, the meeting had successfully brought 
about Islamic theories of  penal law idealised to be incorporated in the 
29 This code was basically the copy of  the penal code in the Netherlands, which 
was in essence the Old Dutch and Roman penal law that went as far back as 1642. The 
uniform Criminal Code (Wetboek van Strafrecht) itself  was based on the Royal Decree 
No. 33 of  October 15, 1915 in S.1915 No. 732.
30 Usulan Perubahan RUU KUHP Hasil Musyawarah, p. iii.
31 Ibid., p. iv.
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draft. In general parlance, there are at least three principles of  Islamic 
penal law submitted in the draft, namely: first, introducing the concept 
of  qishāsh, diyāt (blood money) and kafarah (fine), especially to those 
crimes related to bodily harms; second, permeating the concept of  
╪udūd and ta’zīr; and third, using some Islamic vocabularies related to the 
penal law, such as diyah mugholladzoh, diyah mukhoffafah, ‘irsyu, etc. Those 
are the three core concepts that had been infused into the draft of  the 
penal law. Although the process of  the instalment of  the Islamic penal 
law theories into the draft was heralded by huge debate and rejoinders 
among those Ulama in the meeting, they could finally come to the same 
level on the ideal of  Islamic penal law implementation in the public lives 
of  the Indonesian people. The enormity of  those Ulama could be seen 
in the process of  the discussion of  each topic emanated in the draft. 
In so doing, there were three steps they had taken in the meeting: first, 
the discussion was started initially through separated three commissions 
based on the topics of  the draft; second, general panel discussion for 
the whole participants to gather all Islamic ideas to be submitted into 
the draft; and finally the result of  the discussion in step two was taken 
to a limited forum consisting of  a smaller number of  participants to 
reformulate the final result of  the meeting. We can see therefore that the 
review was done preceded by careful discussions, debates and rejoinders 
among those in the meeting to arrive at the epitome objective, namely 
permeating the ideas of  Islamic penal law into the draft of  the national 
penal code.
Reading the review of  the draft, someone should not forget the 
three classifications of  crimes as taught in the Islamic penal law, i.e., ╪udūd, 
qi╣ā╣ and ta’zīr. In this case, those Ulama in the meeting seemed not to 
go beyond the basic theory of  penal law explained in many classic books 
of  fiqh jināya. There were no less than 17 fiqh books recorded to have 
been chosen by the participants of  the meeting as a resource of  their 
theoretical basis. Those books were: (1) ╩asyiya Tarshikh al-Mustafidin bi 
Tawshikhi Fat╪’l-Mu‘īn by Syaikh Zainuddin ibn ‘Abdil ‘Azīz al-Malibari; (2) 
I‘ānatu’l-╡ālibīn by al-‘Allāma al-Fā╨il al-╣āli╪ al-Kāmil al-Sayyid Abū Bakr; 
(3) Bulūghu’l-Marām by Ibn ╩ajr al-Asqalānī; (4) Suqū╢u’l-‘Uqūba fī’l-Islām 
by Jabr Ma╪mūd al-Fu╨aila; (5) Al-Fiqhu’l-jinā’ī fī’l-Islām by ‘Amir ‘Abd 
al-‘Azīz; (6) Al-Mughnī by Mu╪ammad ‘Abd Allāh ibn A╪ad ibn Ma╪mūd 
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ibn Qudāma; (7) Al-Tasyrī‘u’l-Jinā’ī al-Islāmī by ‘Abd al-Qādir Awda; (8) 
╩ashiya Raddu’l-Mukhtār by Khotimah al-Mu╪aqqiqīn Mu╪ammad Amin 
al-Syahir ibn ‘Abidīn; (9) Kifāyatu’l-Akhyār fī ╩alli ghāyati’l-Ikhti╣ār by Al-
╩usaynī ad-Dimashqī al-Shāfi‘ī; (10) Fiqhu’s-sunna by Sayyid Sābiq; (11) 
Shar╪ Marqoti Sudi al-Ta╣dīq fī Shar╪ Sullamu’t-Tawfīq by al-‘Ālim al-Fa╨il 
Al-Shaikh Mu╪ammad Nawawī; (12) ╩ashiya I‘ānatu╢-╡ālibīn by al-Sayyid 
Abū Bakr; (13) Al-Takmila al-Majmū‘ Shar╪u’l-Muhadhdhab by al-Imām 
Abu Zakariyya Mu╪yidin Sharaf  al-Nawāwī; (14) Fī Dzilāl al-Qur’ān by 
Sayyid Qutb; (15) Al-Muhadhdhab fī Fiqh Madhāhibi’sh-Shāfi‘ī by Al-Shaikh 
al-Jāhid al-Muwaffaq Abū Is╪aq Ibrāhim ibn ‘Ali Yusūf; (16) Bujayrimi 
‘Alī al-Khā╢ib by Al-Fairuzzabadī al-Sirajī al-Sheikh Sulayman al-Bujayrimi; 
(17) Al-Futu╪āt al-Ilāhiyyah bi Taw╨ī╪ Tafsīr al-Jalalayn li al-Daqīq al-Khafiyyah 
by Sulayman Ibn ‘Umar al-Ujayl al-Syāfi‘ī.
Those traditional Arabic books were used as material and 
methodological resources in the process of  inserting Islamic penal 
values into the draft of  the national penal law. Although one may remain 
doubtful whether those Arabic references are fit with the modern 
philosophy of  punishment wrought about in the new national draft, 
the use of  the old Islamic references aptly reflected their sincerity in the 
struggle of  penal law Islamisation. At least, the reading of  the old fiqh and 
tafsīr books is what the symbol of  Islamisation is all about, irrespective 
of  the epistemological problems lingering the process. Despite those 
long and industrious efforts done by Ulama and GARIS protagonists, 
the meeting itself  was finally ended in despair since the government, in 
this case, the Ministry of  Law and Human Rights has never in reality 
taken great care with the draft of  the penal law. The draft is up to now 
not brought yet to the People Assembly (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat), the 
first step to open the hope of  the penal law Islamisation program is thus 
no more than a hollow imagination.
Irrespective of  the unsuccessful political supports, the movement 
to Islamize penal law system in the country has been much talked about in 
the circle of  legal academics and national jurists in the country. The main 
problem haunting the Islamisation cannot be separated from the fact that 
Islamic penal law is fulfilled by traditional penal ideas in which corporal 
punishment is so much colouring the system. This is also clear in what 
expressed in the proposal to improve the government draft substantiated 
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during the Ulama meeting above where corporal punishments remain to 
be the central method of  punishment, besides fine and penitentiary. This 
means that most Muslim experts invited to the meeting were mostly of  
those with a traditional and orthodox understanding of  penal law and 
tended to view the Islamic penal tradition as not receptive towards modern 
views of  punishment. Especially in dealing with such crimes related to 
sexual matters as an illicit sexual relationship, rape, homosexuality or 
any other ‘religious’ criminalities such as religious blasphemy, religious 
deviations, etc., the participants of  the meeting remained to stick with 
traditional fiqh jināyah. It appears therefore that the main mission of  the 
review of  the national penal law draft does not depart from the old idea 
to bolster traditional views of  Islamic penal law into the national criminal 
law system. This was certainly done ignoring the values of  religious 
plurality and multiculturalism deep entrenched within the lives of  the 
people. Imposing certain particular penal tradition in such a plural society 
will certainly ruin the whole structure of  the country.
2. Contra-Christianization 
This issue arose since the early years of  GARIS establishment in 
Cianjur. Indeed, it was a hot topic throughout West Java until about the 
first decade of  the year 2000 to which all Muslim organisations usually 
put their much interest. Their main concern here was that the program 
of  Christianization (in this case understood more like the activity of  
Christian proselytization) was usually done in the midst of  Muslim 
majority so as to easily ignite conflicts between Muslim and Christian 
followers. According to Hernawan, the biggest problem following the 
Christianization programs is at least twofold: First, the common ignorance 
to national regulations dealing with religious entities, specifically the 
Jointly Ministerial Regulation (Surat Peraturan Bersama) between Minister 
of  Religion and Home Minister No. 8 and 9 of  2006 regulating the basic 
rule of  religious preaching in the country; and second, the horizontal 
schism between people with different religious compliance, i.e., Muslims 
and non-Muslims (Christians).32 The point of  the struggle is here laid 
in the efforts to defend the rights of  every Muslim not to be persuaded 
to follow other religious beliefs. In other words, Christianization is 
32 Hernawan, interview (8 May 2009).
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understood here essentially as an effort done to influence people to follow 
the teaching of  Christianity, irrespective of  the fact that the target is an 
individual or a group having already certain religious submission. This is 
certainly seen as transgressing the basic tenets of  Islamic law to which 
all Muslims should hold steadfastly in their everyday lives.
That is exactly the main reason for GARIS to wage the hard 
movement to challenge the Christianization in all its forms. In their 
view, Christianization transgresses the right of  every Muslim to maintain 
their belief  and thus to transgress their basic human rights to which the 
state and every citizen, regardless of  their belief, should recognise. And 
thus, according to GARIS, the movement of  anti-Christianization is par 
excellence part of  legal Islamisation to which they will always put all efforts 
in the field to succeed it. However, in practice, it is not clear what kind 
of  activities properly called as ‘Christianization’ since the boundaries 
in many cases are blurred between the activity of  religious propagation 
and religious implementation. The experience of  GARIS in holding the 
struggle of  anti-Christianization clearly shows such bewilderment. In the 
field, the attack of  GARIS members towards Christian denomination was 
often undertaken under the name of  challenging Christianization, with 
the result that the Christian rights for practising their religious teachings 
were molested.
One of  GARIS biggest movements of  anti-Christianization was 
done in July 2007. On that day, thousands of  GARIS members were 
involved in attacking a Christian valley, called Lembah Karmel, which is 
kind of  religious compound usually used as a place for spiritual retreats 
and praying by Christians from many places around Cianjur. The sudden 
visit of  many GARIS members to this valley was so surprising as around 
2,500 followers of  the Christian denomination were in the preparation 
of  holding an international conference and alumni meeting. There was 
almost a massive fighting between the two groups since GARIS forced 
the Christians to halt the meeting and cancel all programs already planned 
by the committee. One GARIS member explained that the action was 
done rightly to close down the Christianization programs done by a 
certain Christian group in that valley.33 They believed to the issue that the 
compound had been used for quite long time to create a comprehensive 
33 GARIS member, interview (10 Jul 2013).
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program of  Christianization throughout Indonesia. Although the source 
and validity of  the problem are not clear, they feel plausible enough to 
attack the valley sporadically. The violence was successful finally to stop 
all activities in the place. And hundreds of  members of  the Christian 
denomination felt mocked and physically abused by the treatment of  
the GARIS members.
Analysing the case of  the Karmel attack, one will see how violent 
approach has been used effectively as a means to pave the way for 
succeeding any GARIS programs of  Islamisation. Although it remains 
unclear whether the Christian group in the Karmel Valley had organized 
a certain project of  Christianization,34 the attack had already established 
certain painful feeling among Christian in that area. One informant 
expressed this feeling of  an uncomfortable fate of  Christian society as 
a minority group living in the midst of  the majority Muslim community 
of  Cianjur.35 Their rights as religious people having so much passion for 
practising their religious belief  have been truncated with such violent 
actions. This seems the unavoidable consequences of  such a choice of  
method, where violence becomes the basic language of  the struggle, 
the project of  Islamisation could become a means of  oppression of  the 
majority towards the minority.
What is more interesting is the philosophical underpinnings 
involved to back up such a program of  anti-Christianization. According 
to GARIS, Christianization done in a country such as Indonesia where 
Muslims are the majority of  the population transgresses, in essence, the 
messages behind the rule explained in the Jointly Ministerial Regulation 
(Surat Peraturan Bersama) between Minister of  Religious Affairs and Home 
Minister No. 8 and 9 of  2006 on the procedure of  building a worshipping 
place. As regulated in the Ministerial Regulation, the building of  the place 
should be based on the need of  the people in the place concerned. This 
would mean that the building of  the worshipping place should come in 
line with the general purpose of  maintaining the harmony of  the society 
as well as not disturbing public peace and order. That is why that to assure 
those conditions, the construction of  the place should be supported by 
34 One Christian informant told that the issue of  Christianization done by the 
group in Karmel valley is certainly not found in reality.
35 A figure, interview (10 Aug 2009).
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the evidence that there are at least 90 members of  the concerned religious 
group and 60 local residents of  another religious belief  agreed with such 
a building, besides the recommendation of  the local government.36 
As far as the conditions of  the Christian group at Karmel are 
concerned, the Christian activities at the Valley are certainly not capable 
upholding those government regulations,37 even though it was also 
unclear whether the Valley was built by those conditions as emanated by 
the regulation. The main point of  Hernawan’s argument was very clear 
here that the message behind the regulation should be understood as a 
rule that any religious activities should not be undertaken if  local people 
do not support them. Thus, Christianization done in the midst of  the 
majority Muslim population of  Cianjur is just an illegal activity if  it is 
not backed up by people of  the place, the transgression should thus be 
interpreted as disobeying the literal meaning of  the regulation. Hernawan 
here seemed to stress that beyond the inconceivability for Muslims to 
support the Christianization, the project is in itself  contrary to Islamic 
teachings as it will give detrimental effects on the existence of  Islam in 
the place, according to which GARIS has the duty to challenge.38
In this case, GARIS understood legal Islamisation as a means 
to response to the need of  every Muslims feeling safe of  a possible 
attack from non-Muslims endangering their beliefs and religious 
teachings. Christianization is an attack on the belief  of  Islam since its 
main purpose is to persuade Muslims to leave their religious affiliation. 
Understanding Christianization in this way would automatically lead to a 
36 According to the Jointly Ministerial Regulation between Minister of  Religious 
Affairs and Home Minister No. 8 and 9 of  2006, Articles 14-16, constructing places of  
worship should comply with the permission required for construction in general. At the 
same time, it should also follow a number of  the technical conditions, namely, first, an 
obligation to obtain the permission of  at least 90 members of  their own religious group, 
approved by a local official; second, an obligation to obtain the support of  at least 60 local 
residents (of  another religion), approved by the head of  the village; third, obtaining a 
written recommendation supporting the construction from the head of  regency/city 
office of  the department of  religion; and, fourth, the written recommendation from the 
regency/city branch of  the FKUB.  On the Regulation see at http://kemenag.go.id/
file/dokumen/PERMEN906.pdf. Also, Melissa Crouch, ‘Regulating Places of  Worship 
in Indonesia’, pp. 107-114; Melissa Crouch, Law and Religion in Indonesia, pp. 105-106. 
37 Chep Hernawan, interview (7 Oct 2013).
38 Ibid. 
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serious responsibility of  every Muslim to take part confronting it in any 
means possible. In the field, it is not clear however whether Christian 
group in Karmel valley has been proven to organise particular project of  
Christianization as accused by GARIS or they simply practice their own 
religious teachings. The problem is that most people in the grassroots 
are not capable of  distinguishing religious propagation from religious 
implementation since the border between the two has indeed so blurred 
inasmuch as that they do not have any interest to investigate the accusation 
vigilantly. Verification has therefore never been held to disclose the truth, 
but this might be deliberately designed to stir people to the belief  that 
Christianization has happened in the society, the task of  GARIS as a 
guardian of  Islamic law has therefore been valuable of  support. Beyond 
the polemic, whether Christianization had happened, the theoretical 
underpinnings to back up the movement of  anti-Christianization might 
be acceptable but the sporadic violence resulted from such a struggle is 
what everyone needs to put their concern.
3. Challenging Ahmadiyah 
Since its early activities, GARIS has put so much concern on the 
case of  Ahmadiyah in Indonesia. This is what can be seen from many of  
GARIS’ responses since the debate on Ahmadiyah arose heatedly in the 
country circa 2005. In some occasions, Hernawan explicitly expressed 
his willingness to focus GARIS’ Islamisation program on the efforts 
to demolish Ahmadiyah movements in Cianjur and its surrounding 
areas. This kind of  admonition was then proven by GARIS’s attack to 
some Ahmadiyah compounds on September 19, 2005, destroying four 
villages: Penyairan, Cicakra, Neglasari and Ciparay. It was recorded that 
43 houses, four mosques, five small groceries and other uncountable 
kinds of  stuff  were destroyed in one attack on that day.39 GARIS involved 
hundreds of  members in this attack and sporadically left physical as 
well as psychological burdens to the Ahmadiyah followers. Many have 
indeed realised that this kind of  attack would most possibly be inflicted 
to Ahmadiyah group since, with its zero-tolerant character, GARIS would 
consistently threaten all other Muslim groups and denominations viewed 
as not going in line with the mainstream of  Sunnite Islam. 
39 Hasani, Radikalism Agama di Jabodetabek & Jawa Barat, p. 128.
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What is interesting to note is that GARIS escalated movements 
of  anti-Ahmadiyah was so much supported by political constellations 
of  Cianjur around the end of  2005. Wasidi at the time was about to run 
forward for his candidacy as a regent in the second term. He certainly 
needed to get as many voters as possible for the sake of  succeeding his 
campaign; and with this interest, it was not a surprise to see his many 
efforts to approach Muslim groups and organisations in the city. And 
one of  the best issues to attract supports was that of  Ahmadiyah. In 
other words, attacking Ahmadiyah at the time of  Cianjur’s unstable 
politics was possibly not the mere issue derived from certain religious 
interpretations but more a reflection of  specific political needs. Seen 
from that perspective, we can say that viewed from a micro level, GARIS 
action to attack Ahmadiyah groups in a number of  places in Cianjur was 
coincident with the political situation of  the regency, especially when 
experiencing such a shaky political shifting from the old to the new 
leadership. Wasidi did not want to miss the chance. He cleverly tried to 
win the heart of  many Muslim constituents in the city by promulgating 
officially a General Letter of  Decision (Surat Keputusan Bersama), which 
he claimed to have been made with the support and agreement from 
Indonesian Council of  Ulama (Majlis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) and about 
40 mass organisations in Cianjur. The point of  the Letter was very clear 
on the banning of  the existence of  Ahmadi group throughout Cianjur. 
What is interesting is that the Decision Letter was issued just ten days 
after the event of  GARIS attack in a number of  Ahmadiyah compounds 
in Cianjur; thus reflecting so much the concerted design of  demolishing 
the group with state officials and non-state actors worked hand in hand.
Yet, what is no less important is the macro perspective used in 
this kind of  issue where religious, political identity becomes the centre 
of  gravity. GARIS determination to attack Ahmadi group was gaining 
its momentum in July 2005 when MUI had before officially declared 
Ahmadiyah as a deviated religious entity through their fatwa. Although 
this fatwa does not require Muslims in the country to attack or knock 
down many institutional apparatuses of  Ahmadiyah, the declaration 
coming from such a prestigious institution (to which GARIS has so far 
relied much on their religious opinions) worked as a perfect psychological 
backup for their violent movement. In this concern, what MUI has done 
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was not by commission taking part in such a movement to attack Ahmadiyah 
brutally and sporadically but by omission giving support to any kinds of  
movements directing to challenge Ahmadiyah and their existence in the 
country.
One may wonder what the reasons that could steer such a mass 
organisation as GARIS to passionately attack Ahmadiyah, considering 
that the latter is a Muslim group as well. The answer seems to derive from 
the historical fact of  the persistent conflict between Sunnite Islam and 
Ahmadi group on the issue of  prophecy. In the view of  Sunnite Muslims, 
the belief  in the next prophecies after the prophet Muhammad is what 
makes Ahmadiyah considered as a group deviated from the mainstream 
Islam. The belief  as such would lead to an understanding that besides 
the Sunnah of  the Prophet Muhammad that could serve as the source of  
Islamic law, there might still be another Sunnah to be treated the same 
as well. This certainly detriments the basic legal tenet of  Islam; the 
conflicting attitude of  GARIS towards Ahmadi group is, therefore, a 
perennial one and all is based on their theological foundations believed 
to be established by a certain rigid understanding of  the religion. Since 
challenging this group is departed from the knowledge of  the need of  
every Muslim to uphold their belief  and save the true teaching of  Islam, 
in the attack towards the Ahmadi group, GARIS believes to have involved 
them in the process of  saving Islam from many deviated teachings that 
will destroy Islam from within. Legal Islamisation understood in this 
project is thus laid in the point of  the struggle to save the real basic 
source of  Islamic law, i.e., the Sunnah of  the last prophet Muhammad, 
to which no one after him can serve as such.
It is worth noting that the harsh attitude of  GARIS towards 
Ahmadiyah is not without supports from other Muslim mass organisations 
in Cianjur. At least, no one of  them showed their concern or apprehension 
when GARIS attacked Ahmadiyah compounds, even though everyone 
knows that it brought many casualties. We can say therefore that the 
state quasi-supports, at least what was shown from the decision of  the 
Cianjur regent, as well as those expressed in the MUI’s fatwa, had given 
a result in the backup, both implicitly and explicitly, coming from the 
common mass Muslim organisations in Cianjur. The GARIS movements 
of  anti-Ahmadiyah could be said to have been substantiated since its 
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early phase by political as well as theological underpinnings. Although 
many had disagreed with the violent method used in the movement, 
they did not show their criticism. People in the city had just witnessed 
the deteriorating fate of  Ahmadiyah as a marginalised minority Muslim 
group in the midst of  the silent majority Sunnite Muslim society.
Interestingly, GARIS’s project of  anti-Ahmadiyah movements 
was undertaken not only in Cianjur and its surrounding area but outside 
the regency as well. This seemed related to the long-term mission of  
the organisation to spread its programs of  Islamisation outside Cianjur 
regency. That was what appeared when GARIS sent a lot of  its members 
to attend the public hearing session in the process of  the judicial review 
of  the Law No. 1 of  1965 on religious blasphemy in the Constitutional 
Court in Jakarta. Although the hearing was initially designed to specifically 
debating whether the Law transgresses the principle of  religious freedom 
espoused in the Constitution, it turned to become such kind of  arena 
for majority Muslim organizations to back up the idea to maintain the 
Law No. 1 of  1965 as they saw it as not contravening the principle 
of  religious freedom. They even used the session to substantiate their 
defensive arguments against many cases of  defamations directed to Islam, 
an evidence of  an alarming situation for the Constitutional Court not to 
accept the idea of  reviewing the Law as it would mean to possibly destruct 
Article 1, which explicitly forbids the acts of  religious blasphemy.40 This 
thinking came mainly from Muslim organisations in the country believing 
in the need to maintain the Law so that the sacredness of  religious 
teachings can be protected by the state. They were also arguing that the 
judicial review would only result in the situation of  legal vacuum --at 
least until the new law is successfully promulgated-- so as to lead people 
undermining the message contained in the Article 1 of  the Law, and 
freely denigrating religious teachings.
GARIS understood that attending the hearing session of  the judicial 
review is part of  their struggle to save Islam from many new teachings 
deviated from the true understanding of  the religion. And one of  such 
deviated groups was certainly the Ahmadi whose teachings had been 
40 The discussion on the judicial review of  the Law No.1/1965 at ‘Talks on the 
Blasphemy Law: Human Rights vs. Mainstream Islam, An Off  Stream Presentation by 
M. Isanegri’, KITLV, Leiden University, the Netherlands, June 24, 2010.  
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seen by majority Ulama to have departed far beyond the true teaching of  
Islam. GARIS believes that Ahmadi’s teaching of  the prophecy after the 
Prophet Muhammad is an evidence of  their deviation from the true Islam 
so that any activities done to propagate their teaching will automatically 
fulfil the criteria of  religious blasphemy as emanated in Article 1 of  the 
Law. That was why GARIS sent a lot of  members to attend the hearing 
session in the Constitutional Court. Although no one of  GARIS people 
was invited to speak in front of  the hearing forum, their presence can 
deliberately be denoted as showing a significant support to the issue of  
anti-religious blasphemy. A big number of  the members were sent to 
Jakarta by bus specifically rented for that purpose; their presence in front 
of  the Court’s building as well as in the room during the hearing session 
through displaying the banner attacking the opponent views, raising their 
voice or threatening others seen as having different opinion were just 
examples of  the method to demonstrate the struggle. In this way, what 
was believed was that through such an extra-legal movement, GARIS 
could influence the Court in the process of  making the decision of  the 
issue in concern, although many may view it as too harsh and could be 
trapped into criminal contempt.41
In this issue of  Ahmadiyah, it is clear that GARIS has used their 
mission of  legal Islamisation as a leeway to express their understanding 
of  Islam and to act offensively towards others having a different opinion. 
The meaning of  legal Islamisation thus works here unlimited to any 
activities to propagate Islamic legal implementation in everyday lives 
of  the people but to include also any means to pave the way for certain 
mainstream interpretation of  Islamic law (or Islam in general) accepted 
as the sole value in the society and accordingly marginalising others. This 
might be the consequence of  Islam itself  as a religion with multifaceted 
values. As the understanding of  Islamic law can also be varied, the project 
of  legal Islamisation can be brought into certain meaning in conjunction 
with the views embraced by the agent of  the Islamisation itself. In other 
words, considering GARIS as one of  the proponents of  Sunnite Islam, 
undertaking the attack toward Ahmadiyah might be viewed as coming 
in line with the campaign to propagate the ‘true’ Sunnite understanding 
41 Criminal contempt, in this case, is understood as acts disrespectful of  the 
court or its processes.
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of  Islam itself, according to which any opponent interpretations could 
be categorized as heresy to Islam and thus suitable as an object of  the 
harsh Islamisation movements.
E. Concluding Remarks 
In the present discussions about Islamisation of  legal systems, the 
movement has usually been understood to occur in many Muslim-majority 
countries since the last quarter of  the twentieth century, encompassing 
at least three legal domains working as gateways for the incorporation 
of  Islamic law into certain legal systems of  contemporary states. First, 
Islamic law is understood as a constitutional standard and aspiration; 
second, as a source of  substantive law; and third, as ‘a result of  the 
operation of  rules of  international private law’.42 Yet, particularly in many 
Western secular countries, the struggle of  legal Islamisation has also 
appeared in the form of  alternative dispute resolutions (ADR) in which 
Islamic substantive law is implemented outside the domain of  official legal 
institutions.43 A number of  methods have thus been created therefore to 
assure that the legal teachings of  Islamic law can be implemented and 
inserted into the modern legal system of  the country.
In the case of  Indonesia, seen from the perspective of  legal theory, 
the scope of  the struggle of  legal Islamisation can be characterised as 
focusing on three different levels: First, national (higher) law, where 
the movement is focused on the Islamisation of  the constitution and 
fundamental laws of  the country. Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) seems 
to stress on this level, such what we can see from their proposals for 
amending the 1945 Constitution and Basic Penal Law of  the country 
outlined in the early 2000s. Second, local law. The struggle at this level 
is usually centred on the Islamisation of  the state by-laws, touching the 
issues emanated in the local regulations. Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariah 
Islam (KPPSI) in South Sulawesi is the best example in this concern, 
where movements are focused on building Islamic regional regulations 
working in certain regents or districts. And the third, law in general 
42 Martin Lau, “The Re-Islamisation of  Legal Systems”, in The Ashgate Research 
Companion to Islamic Law, ed. by Rudolph Peters and Peri Bearman (England and 
Burlington: Ashgate, 2014), p. 235. 
43  Ibid., p. 234.
421Al-Jāmi‘ah, Vol. 54, No. 2, 2016 M/1437 H
Islamization as Legal Intolerance
meaning, i.e., the law used in a rather loose term incorporating any ideas of  
normative values related to all aspects of  life, not only the ones managed 
through the state laws. GARIS here seems to base their struggles on the 
understanding of  law not confined only to the ones attached to the state 
but broader and practical aspects of  law in its relation to everyday lives 
of  the people. Thus, if  the other organisations such as MMI and KPPSI 
above focus their interests in the formal (state) law of  the country, either 
in the national or regional levels, GARIS seems to plunge themselves 
into the realm of  non-formal laws.
Reading carefully the paragraphs above, one will see how the idea 
of  legal Islamisation is carefully moulded in the field to make it so fluid 
and adequate to accomplish a purpose. Islamisation of  law cannot be 
defined here solely based on the perspective of  Westphalian view where 
a law is seen from the established institution of  the state only. Law can 
indeed come from the state but certainly not necessary. This gives a 
consequence that to understand Islamisation of  law we should vigilantly 
see how people in general or the actor of  the Islamisation, in particular, 
comprehend the meaning of  the law itself. This current study has tried to 
show that as one example of  non-state Muslim organisations concerned 
with the issue of  the Islamisation, GARIS has leniently understood the 
law in a wider scope, encompassing not only the state law but also non-
state normative orderings. If  this is correct, the Islamisation of  law done 
by this mass organization involve not only the effort to bring the state 
legal system in par with Islamic values but also any struggle to pave the 
way for the implementation of  Islamic teachings in general in everyday 
lives of  the people, either related to (formal) law or not. 
The three examples of  GARIS’ Islamisation programs as explained 
above show very clear how Islamic law emulates all aspects of  life, from 
the matters of  belief  such as religious conversion, proselytization and 
abiding by certain madhhab – in essence, personal matters, to such a big 
public matter as penal law system working in the country. One might view 
that submitting to a certain school of  law in Islam or certain religious 
belief  is the basic human right each people should uphold, but GARIS 
might not follow this perspective due to their understanding of  Islamic 
law as an all-encompassing legal tradition dealing with all aspects of  life. 
There is no need to separate the realms of  the public from a personal 
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law, as all can come under one umbrella of  the religious law. Based on the 
prophetic tradition explicating all Muslims to challenge any wrongdoings 
found everywhere -- seen as the expression of  the religious belief--, 
GARIS has a valid theological basis to embark on their Islamisation 
programs in any means whatsoever.
Thus the organisation can see itself  as having an obligation to tackle 
any cases perceived as transgressing the basic tenets of  Islam. This is 
what seems to ignite many conflicts in the society since their monolithic 
approach in understanding Islamic law will certainly invite others to 
confront. And violence would thus not be an unusual impact involved 
in the struggle. No doubt, this can be excellent modus operandi for many 
members of  GARIS to trap themselves transgressing the principle of  
human rights in undertaking such projects of  Islamisation. In the name 
of  certain legal ideology, GARIS can embark openly to challenge violently 
what they view as wrongdoings due to the mere differences in opinion 
of  certain laws or faith. GARIS has also practically judged certain legal 
opinions as going astray since their disjunction with the mainstream 
views in general. This kind of  attitude is what makes GARIS to be 
considered as one of  the most radical local Muslim groups in West Java 
consistently transgressing the principles of  religious tolerance. Any acts 
of  violence, distinction, restriction and also preference showed in the 
three projects of  penal law Islamisation, anti-Christianization, as well as 
an anti-Ahmadi group, have fulfilled the criterion of  intolerance initiated 
by the Declaration on the Elimination of  All Forms of  Intolerance and 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. Those acts were done due 
to certain theological understanding believed to be based on Islamic 
teachings emanated in the sacred texts, regardless of  human rights values 
and fundamental freedoms believed to be the basis of  the democratic 
society built in the country. As a consequence, the acts of  intolerance will 
certainly result in the feeling of  discord and awkwardness in the midst 
of  people where the Islamisation projects are undertaken.
Furthermore, one may need to be aware also that since National 
Law is idealized to include all Indonesian people regardless of  religion, 
skin color, ethnic, race, etc., the Islamisation projects as done by GARIS 
may run in contradiction to the epistemology of  the law and legal 
system built in the plural society of  Indonesia. In the current situation, 
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the problem we encounter is how to consolidate the idea of  uniformed 
(united) national law and the message behind the local movement of  
Islamisation. While National Law is imagined as a general law to include 
any particularities existing in the country, the idea of  legal Islamisation is 
embarked by particularism and localism to which favouritism works as 
the main logic of  the struggle. This is what seems unanswered since what 
is appearing now is not the theoretical predicament of  such a process 
but its political impacts, as legal Islamisation is more sensed as a political 
movement than that of  law.
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